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The Return to Capital in China
CHINA HAS ONE of the highest investment rates in the world, over 40 percent
of its GDP in recent years. A natural question to ask is: Does China invest
too much? On the one hand, China is still a low-income economy, with a
capital-labor ratio that is low compared with those of advanced economies,
and thus the potential returns to investment could be high. On the other
hand, as Robert Lucas pointed out,
1 other constraints, such as low levels
of human capital, backward technology, and low quality of institutions,
may limit the realization of these potential high returns in China as in
other developing countries. The fact that capital often ﬂows from poor to
rich countries reminds us that the return to capital is not always higher in
poor countries.
What does it mean to say that China invests too much? A natural metric
to use in answering this question is the return to capital. For example,
China’s economic growth rate might have been so high that the return to
capital has fallen little, if at all, despite high investment rates. Put differently,
the investment rate in China might be high precisely because the return to
capital in China is high. The questions to be asked, then, are: Has the return
to capital in China fallen signiﬁcantly over time? Is it now low relative to
returns in other countries?
Another issue concerns the allocation of investment within China—
whether China has invested too much in certain sectors or certain regions
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returns changed over time?
This paper measures the return to capital in China, calculated using data
on the share of capital in total income, the capital-output ratio (where both
capital and output are measured at market prices), the depreciation rate,
and the growth rate of output prices relative to capital prices. Although the
approach is conceptually straightforward, the major challenge is the data,
which we discuss below before presenting our estimates.
Although we are not aware of any other papers that estimate the aggre-
gate return to capital in China, many papers have reported estimates of the
capital stock in the course of estimating productivity growth in China.
2 Our
estimates of the capital stock in China differ from these earlier estimates
in two principal ways. First, we make use of the updated data reported by
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) after the 2004 census. Second,
we calculate the capital stock in market prices rather than in constant prices.
We do this because our goal is to calculate the return to capital, which is a
function of the capital-output ratio measured at market prices.
We begin by discussing the methodology we use to estimate the return to
capital. We next discuss the data and address several potential measurement
problems. We then present our estimates of the aggregate return to capital
in China, ﬁrst for a base case using simple aggregate measures and then for
a number of alternatives. These include alternative sectoral concepts that
remove residential housing, agriculture, and mining, and alternative capital
concepts that include inventories and consider various depreciation rates
for ﬁxed capital. We also measure after-tax returns for our base case, and
we compare our base case estimate of the return to capital for China with
estimates for other economies. Finally, we consider the efﬁciency of capital
allocation in China by measuring the dispersion of the return to capital
across sectors and regions and how it has changed over time.
Our base case estimate shows that the aggregate rate of return to cap-
ital in China fell from roughly 25 percent between 1979 and 1992 to
about 20 percent between 1993 and 1998 and has remained in the vicinity
of 20 percent since 1998. These rates of return are above those for most
advanced economies calculated on a similar basis. They are also high rela-
tive to a large sample of economies at all stages of development. Estimates
62 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
2. For example, Perkins (1988), Chow and Li (2002), Huang, Ren, and Liu (2002), and
Young (2003).
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show returns rising in recent years. All in all, our ﬁndings on the return to
capital provide no evidence to believe that China invests too much in the
aggregate—all sectors, regions, and types of ownership included. And what
evidence we have on the dispersion of returns suggests that investment in
China is being distributed more efﬁciently than in the past.
Methodology
There are several methods one can use to measure the return to capital.
One method is to use estimates of the return to capital in ﬁnancial markets
to back out the aggregate return to capital. This would be a natural method
to use in a country with well-developed ﬁnancial markets, but it is clearly
inappropriate in the Chinese context. A second method is to estimate the
return to capital by regressing output on a measure of the capital stock.
However, this method would lead to biased estimates of the return to capital,
because the capital stock is surely affected by omitted variables that also
affect aggregate output.
The method we will use to measure the return to capital is quite simple
in that it is based on only one assumption and one accounting identity.
Consider a decision by a ﬁrm at the margin to purchase a unit of capital
for use in production. If we assume that the ﬁrm takes the output price as
given (we will relax this assumption later), the nominal return from this
transaction is
Here i is the nominal rate of return, PY is the price of the output good, PKj is
the price of capital of type j, δj is the depreciation rate of type j capital,
MPKj is the marginal physical product of type j capital, and P ˆ
Kj is the
percentage rate of change of the price of type j capital. (This is simply a
rewriting of the Hall-Jorgenson rental price equation.) Two things are
important to notice about this equation. First, if asset markets for capital
goods are working efﬁciently, the return from investing in capital should
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mining the return to capital is not the marginal physical product of capital,
but rather the ratio of the marginal revenue product of capital to the price
of capital.
We cannot estimate the nominal return to capital directly from the above
equation, because we do not observe the marginal product of capital. How-
ever, we can infer it from data on capital’s share of total output, which 
we may proxy as 1 minus labor’s share, or where W is wages
and L employment. The share of payments to capital is given by
Substituting equation 1 into this accounting identity, we get
Here
denotes the nominal value of the aggregate capital stock,
denotes the average growth rate of the price of capital, and
denotes the average depreciation rate, which changes over time with the
composition of the capital stock. The real rate of return to capital r(t) can
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China (which we refer to as the “return to capital” for short).
The key thing to notice about equation 4 is that we measure the capital-
output ratio at market prices, which includes any expected change in the
price of capital as part of its return. Francesco Caselli and James Feyrer
also make this point in the context of measuring differences in the return
to capital across countries.
3 When the price of capital is equal to the price
of output and the growth rates of these two prices are the same, equation 4
boils down to the familiar expression that the real rate of return to capital
is the ratio of the capital share in income to the real capital-output ratio
minus the depreciation rate.
Our expression for the return to capital assumes that ﬁrms take output
prices as given. When the output price exceeds marginal cost, the capital
share will include proﬁts (π), reﬂecting imperfect competition. In this case 
the marginal revenue product is  where µ ≥ 1 denotes the ratio of
price to marginal cost (or 1 plus the markup). Thus equation 2 becomes
Since the portion of revenue accruing to such proﬁts is given by  the 
real return to capital is now
This shows that ignoring the presence of imperfect competition gives an
upward bias to the marginal return to capital realized by ﬁrms.
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the price of capital grows at the same rate as the price of output; that the
labor share is 50 percent, the depreciation rate 10 percent, and the nominal
capital-output ratio 1.67;
4 and that ﬁrms take output prices as given, the
real return to capital is 20 percent. If we relax the price-taking assumption
and assume a markup over marginal cost of 10 percent, the real return to
capital falls to 14 percent instead. We will not take the markup into account
when estimating the real return to capital in China. Since our goal is to
compare the return to capital in China over time and with returns to capital
in other countries, this comparison based on our estimates will be mislead-
ing only if the bias due to imperfect competition has changed over time in
China or is either more or less prevalent in China than in other countries in
the world.
Data
We need three pieces of data to back out the return to capital: a measure
of aggregate output, a measure of the aggregate capital stock, and a mea-
sure of the share of payments to capital. We describe each in turn.
Aggregate Output
As with data for any country, one always has to consider the possibility
that the GDP estimates provided by China’s NBS are inaccurate. Two
important institutional details about the Chinese statistical system matter
in this context. First, the backbone of the Chinese national accounts is the
data provided by local governments to the NBS. Many observers argue that
local governments have an incentive to overstate local GDP. Although this
has been true in certain periods, the NBS is well aware of the problem and
uses independently sourced data to adjust the data provided by local govern-
ments. As a result, reported aggregate GDP is typically lower than the
sum of reported provincial GDPs. In addition, local governments do not
always have an incentive to overstate GDP. In recent years, for example,
the central government has been trying to cool down the economy, and this
has given local governments an incentive to understate local GDP so as to
evade the central government’s contractionary macroeconomic policies.
66 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
4. As discussed later, these are the rough numbers in the case of China.
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nationwide economic censuses, which historically have been conducted
every ten years.
5 After a census is conducted, the NBS retrospectively
revises its previous estimates of aggregate GDP. Clearly, if the economy
has been growing rapidly, the unrevised data will be less accurate as one
gets further away from the latest census year, and thus the retrospective
adjustments in the most recent years will be larger as well. Fortunately,
the last such census took place fairly recently, in 2004, and the NBS has
revised its estimates of nominal GDP from 1978 through 2004 on the
basis of this census.
6 In these new data, GDP in 2004 was revised upward
by 16.8 percent, or several times the 4.4 percent upward revision for gross
ﬁxed capital formation from the same census. We will use the revised
national accounts data provided by the NBS for our estimates, which will
obviously account for some of the differences between the numbers we
use for the investment rate in China and those used in previous studies. To
maintain consistency, we also adjust the provincial estimates so that the
sum of provincial GDPs equals the estimate of national GDP.
7
Angus Maddison has criticized China’s GDP data from two perspectives,
arguing that ofﬁcial GDP was underestimated for 1978 and that the growth
rate of the ofﬁcial GDP deﬂator is too low.
8 However, any potential problem
with the 1978 estimate would obviously only affect our estimate of the return
to capital in that year, and not those for more recent years. The potential
problem with the GDP deﬂator does not affect our estimate of the nominal
return to capital, because we measure GDP in current instead of constant
prices, but it would obviously affect our estimate of the real return to cap-
ital. We note, however, that the NBS retrospectively increased the growth
rate of the GDP deﬂators after the 2004 census, and we use these revised
deﬂators for our estimates.
Chong-En Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Yingyi Qian 67
5. Two censuses resulted in major revisions to the GDP data. The 1993 census was for
the tertiary sector, and the 2004 census was for all nonagricultural sectors.
6. Revised GDP data are reported in China Statistical Yearbook 2006.
7. Provincial GDP data are reported in Hsueh and Li (1999), NBS (2003), and the 2004–06
editions of China Statistical Yearbook. Because we are mainly interested in the dispersion
of returns among provinces, we did not revise provincial GDP and investment data after the
2004 census. Allocating the increase in GDP and investment among provinces proportion-
ally would not change the results.
8. Maddison (1998). To address the potential bias in the GDP deﬂator, Young (2003)
uses alternative price indices to deﬂate nominal GDP.
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in particular the possibility of overstatement. For example, if multinational
ﬁrms face lower tax rates in China than in their home countries, they may
deliberately, through their internal transfer pricing, overstate their proﬁts
and the value added of their Chinese operations so as to reduce their tax
liability in the home country. There are several reasons why this need not be
a real problem, however. First of all, the proﬁts reported to the government
statistical agencies by ﬁrms in China are not to be used for tax purposes.
9
Second, some multinational ﬁrms can claim a tax credit in their home
country for taxes paid to the Chinese government. Third, the problem just
described affects only foreign ﬁrms; domestic ﬁrms do not necessarily face
incentives to overstate their proﬁts. In fact, Hongbin Cai, Qiao Liu, and




The second thing we need to measure is the capital stock. China’s NBS
releases a series called “investment in ﬁxed assets.” This statistic, reported
monthly, is the one most frequently used by Chinese government ofﬁcials
to measure aggregate investment. Figure 1 shows that investment in ﬁxed
assets increased from 20 percent of GDP in 1981 to just below 50 percent
in 2005. This evidence has prompted many observers to conclude not only
that China’s investment rate is too high, but also that this ongoing trend of
a rising investment share in GDP cannot be sustained.
However, there are two reasons why this widely used series may not
provide an accurate measure of the change in China’s capital stock.
11 The
ﬁrst is that the NBS counts the value of purchased land and expenditure
on used machinery and preexisting structures as part of investment in
ﬁxed assets. Clearly, neither of these should be regarded as an increase in
China’s reproducible capital stock. The second is that the series is based
68 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
9. Article 33 of “Regulations on National Economic Census” states that “[T]he use of
materials regarding units and individuals collected in economic census shall be strictly lim-
ited to the purpose of economic census and shall not be used by any unit as the basis for
imposing penalties on respondents of economic census.”
10. Cai, Liu, and Xiao (2005).
11. Xu (2000).
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understate aggregate investment.
12
Although less widely used, an alternative estimate of investment that
addresses these problems, called “gross ﬁxed capital formation,” is avail-
able from the NBS, but only once a year rather than monthly. The NBS
calculates this measure by subtracting the value of land sales and expen-
diture on used machinery and buildings from investment in ﬁxed assets,
and then adds expenditure on small-scale investment projects. As ﬁgure 1
shows, the investment rate as measured by the share of gross ﬁxed capital
formation in GDP increased much less rapidly than did that measured by
investment in ﬁxed assets, rising from 30 percent in 1978 to 42 percent in
2005. Since gross ﬁxed capital formation is a more accurate measure of
the change in China’s reproducible capital stock, this is the series we will
use to measure the capital stock in China.
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12. Speciﬁcally, before 1997 the investment survey asked ﬁrms to report all investment
expenditures over 50,000 yuan. Beginning in 1997 the threshold was increased to invest-








1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Investment in fixed assets
Gross fixed capital formation
Figure 1. Investment in China, 1978–2005
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ferent types of investment, whereas the series on investment in ﬁxed assets
is disaggregated into investment in structures and buildings and investment
in machinery and equipment.
13 To get around this problem, we assume that
the shares of the two types of capital in ﬁxed capital formation are the same
as those for total investment in ﬁxed assets.
14
We now turn to the investment price deﬂators. After 1990 the NBS
reports separate price indices for investment in structures and buildings and
for investment in machinery and equipment. For 1978–89 we assume that
the price of structures is accurately measured by the deﬂator of value added
in the construction industry.
15 Similarly, we assume that the price of machin-
ery and equipment during the same period is accurately measured by the
output price deﬂator of the domestic machinery and equipment industry.
Before 1978 we assume that the growth rate of the prices of the two types
of investment goods is simply the growth rate of the aggregate price of
ﬁxed capital formation.
16
With data on nominal investment and investment prices in hand, we
estimate the quantity of the two types of capital using the standard perpetual
inventory approach. We initialize the capital stock in 1952 as the ratio of
investment in 1953 (the ﬁrst year for which investment data are available)
to the sum of the average growth rate of investment in 1953–58 and the
depreciation rate. We assume that the depreciation rate is 8 percent for
structures and 24 percent for machinery.
17
Our procedure for calculating the capital stock differs from those used by
other authors. Dwight Perkins uses the capital accumulation series reported
by the NBS under the Material Production System (the national accounts
system used under central planning); this series is no longer available after
70 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
13. This is why many Chinese researchers (for example, Huang, Ren, and Liu, 2002;
Wang and Wu, 2003) use investment in ﬁxed assets series to estimate the capital stock.
14. Our data for 1952–77 are from Hsueh and Li (1999). Data for 1978–2004 were
adjusted after the 2004 National Economic Census and are published in China Statistical
Yearbook 2006 together with the 2005 data.
15. From 1990 to 2004 (when both series are available), the correlation between the
construction output deﬂator and the deﬂator for investment in structures is 0.95.
16. The price indices for ﬁxed capital formation before 1978 are from Hsueh and Li
(1999).
17. We arrive at these estimates of depreciation rates from estimates in Wang and Wu
(2003) of the useful lives of structures and buildings (thirty-eight years) and machinery and
equipment (twelve years).
10269-02a_Bai Hsieh-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 701993.18 He assumes an annual depreciation rate of 5 percent and an initial
capital-output ratio (in 1980) of 3. Gregory Chow and Kui-Wai Li measure
investment by gross capital formation (including inventories), use account-
ing depreciation as reported in the national accounts instead of economic
depreciation, and use Chow’s proprietary data to estimate the initial capital
stock (in 1953).
19 The procedure we use is conceptually similar to that
used by Yongfeng Huang, Ruoen Ren, and Xiaosheng Liu and by Alwyn
Young,
20 although the details differ. Huang, Ren, and Liu use investment
in ﬁxed assets disaggregated into investment in structures and buildings
and investment in machinery and equipment. They deﬂate nominal invest-
ment (of both types of capital) by the retail price index. Young computes
the capital stock for the nonagricultural sector from the NBS series on
gross ﬁxed capital formation but does not distinguish between the two types
of capital. In turn, he imputes the price index for investment as the resid-
ual of the price of aggregate nonagricultural output after subtracting the
price of consumption and export goods.
Share of Capital
The ﬁnal piece of information we need is the share of capital in total
income, which we calculate as the residual of labor income. The NBS pro-
vides annual data on the labor share for each province and each sector
but not for the aggregate economy.
21 We therefore estimate the aggre-
gate labor share as the average of the provincial labor shares weighted by
the share of each province in GDP. As table 1 shows, the resulting esti-
mate of the capital share typically ﬂuctuates between 46 and 50 percent of
GDP but experiences a sharp rise from 2003 through 2005.
There are potentially two concerns about our use of the NBS estimate of
aggregate labor income in this calculation. First, the reported labor shares
may understate true labor income (and thus overstate true capital income)
if there are unmeasured nonwage beneﬁts. However, the NBS explicitly
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18. Perkins (1988).
19. Chow and Li (2002); Chow (1993).
20. Huang, Ren, and Liu (2002); Young (2003).
21. See Hsueh and Li (1999) for 1978–95, NBS (2003) for 1996–2002, China Statisti-
cal Yearbook 2004 for 2003, and China Statistical Yearbook 2006 for 2005. The share of
capital in total income for 2004 is missing from the ofﬁcial data and is therefore taken to be
the average of those for 2003 and 2005.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10269-02a_Bai Hsieh-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 73includes an estimate of nonwage beneﬁts in the numbers for labor income.
In the manufacturing sector, for example, nonwage benefits account for
20 percent and wage income for 30 percent of aggregate income in the
sector.
22
Second, the NBS estimates may again understate the labor share if, 
as in many developing countries, the reported ﬁgures for aggregate labor
income exclude the imputed labor income of self-employed workers.
23 In
fact, before 2005, the NBS counted all self-employment income as labor
income. Therefore our estimates for those years actually overstate the true
labor share and understate the true capital share. In 2005 the NBS for the
ﬁrst time explicitly excluded the imputed capital income of self-employed
workers from the published estimates of labor income. Unfortunately, the
NBS does not report the magnitude of this adjustment, and so we are unable
to adjust our capital share estimates accordingly for the years before 2005.
Estimates of the Return to Capital
Figure 2 plots our base case estimate of the aggregate rate of return to
capital in China, derived from equation 4 and the data in table 1. Again,
this estimate properly aggregates structures and equipment and measures the
capital-output ratio in current prices. As the ﬁgure shows, the annual return
to capital in China fell between 1993 and 1998 from roughly 25 percent to
20 percent. Since 1998 the annual return to capital has remained in the
vicinity of 20 percent, despite the 8-percentage-point increase in the invest-
ment rate (figure 1). Therefore a central finding is that, despite China
having one of the highest rates of investment in the world, the return to
capital in China does not appear to be signiﬁcantly lower than that in the
rest of the world.
24
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22. We get the 30 percent wage income share by aggregating wage payments and value
added from ﬁrm-level data from the Chinese industrial survey in 2003. Since the NBS
reports that the share of total labor compensation (including nonwage beneﬁts) in the man-
ufacturing sector is 50 percent, the NBS’s imputed nonwage income must be 20 percent of
manufacturing value added.
23. Gollin (2002).
24. See, for example, Poterba (1998) for a comparison of rates of return to capital in a
sample of countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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the growth rate of the investment goods deﬂator and the growth rate of the
GDP deﬂator was extremely volatile during the 1992–95 period: on average,
the relative price of capital rose 10 percent a year in 1992–93 and fell by
10 percent a year in 1994–95. In all other years the relative price of capital
grew at a fairly stable annual rate of between −3 and 3 percent. To elimi-
nate the volatility in the estimated return to capital caused by the volatility
in the relative price of capital during 1992–95, we adjust the GDP deﬂator
over this period by assuming that its growth rate was proportional to that
of the investment goods deﬂator over the same period, while maintaining
the accumulated growth of the GDP deﬂator over this period.
Second, the data we use for 2004 and 2005 are preliminary, for three
reasons. One is that the NBS did not provide an estimate of the labor share
in 2004. We therefore assumed that the labor share in 2004 is the average of
the labor share in 2003 and 2005. Another is that, as noted earlier, the labor
share in 2005 excludes the imputed capital income of self-employed workers,








1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.
a. Dashed line indicates preliminary results.
Figure 2. Base Case Estimate of Return to Capital, 1978–2005
a
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the 2005 data reported in the 2006 China Statistical Yearbook are prelim-
inary and are likely to be revised by the NBS in 2007.
The base case provides estimates of the rate of return that are most com-
parable with commonly cited aggregate measures for other countries. Alter-
native measures that require additional, disaggregated data may be more
useful for some purposes, but these data may be less reliable. Nonetheless,
it is useful to look at some alternative estimates using the data that are avail-
able. These estimates address both conceptual and measurement issues that
affect the base case. They include alternative measures of the capital stock
relevant for business investment and alternative measures of the income
associated with such investment.
We ﬁrst measure the return to capital excluding residential housing.
Investment in residential housing has increased very rapidly in China, but
it is possible that the ﬂow of services generated by the housing stock is
undervalued in the Chinese national accounts. Speciﬁcally, the NBS imputes
the rental value of the housing stock as 3 percent of the original value of
the housing stock. Figure 3 presents our estimate of the return to the non-
76 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.








1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Base case
Capital stock excluding urban 
residential housing
Figure 3. Return to Capital Excluding Urban Residential Housing, 1978–2005
a
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housing stock from the aggregate capital stock and subtracting the imputed
rent on urban residential housing from our estimate of aggregate output and
capital income.
25 As the ﬁgure shows, the annual return to nonhousing
capital is roughly 5 percentage points higher than the annual return to the
aggregate capital stock.
In the base case we measure capital income as the difference between
labor income and total income. However, nonlabor income includes rents to
agricultural land and mineral resources as well as the return to reproducible
capital. Ideally, one would like to exclude these rents from our measure of
capital income. In the absence of data that would allow us to do this, we
estimate the return to capital in the nonagricultural and nonmining (and
petroleum) sectors.
26 That is, we exclude the (reproducible) capital stock in
the agriculture and mining sectors from the capital stock: we exclude output
in these two sectors from our estimate of aggregate output; and we exclude
capital income in these two sectors from our measure of aggregate capital
income.
As can be seen in ﬁgure 4, the return to capital in the nonagricultural
sectors slightly exceeds the aggregate return to capital in the early 1980s, but
the two are virtually the same after 1988. Similarly, the return to capital in
the nonmining sectors (figure 5) is higher than the aggregate return to
capital in the 1980s. During this period the government set prices of min-
eral products artiﬁcially low. However, the gap narrows in the 1990s, after
the prices of mineral products and petroleum went up sharply. For most
of the period, the returns in these two alternative measures differ little from
the returns in the base case.
Our base case estimate assumes constant depreciation rates over time.
However, given that depreciation reﬂects not only physical depreciation but
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25. Data on investment in residential housing are from China Statistical Yearbook, var-
ious years. The price index and the depreciation rate for buildings and structures are used to
construct the stock of residential housing. Total residential rent is computed by multiplying
urban population by urban housing rent (or expense) per capita, obtained from China Sta-
tistical Yearbook, various years.
26. Data on the value added of mining industries before 1995 are from China Industrial
Economy Statistical Yearbook and those after 1995 are from China Statistical Yearbook. Data
on investment in the mining industries before 2000 are from NBS (2002), and those after
2000 are from China Statistical Yearbook 2006. The investment data include only construc-
tion and installation. The underestimate of the investment in the mining sector will result in a
downward bias of the estimated return to capital when the mining sector is excluded.
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Base case
Nonagricultural capital stock
Figure 4. Return to Nonagricultural Capital, 1978–2005
a
Figure 5. Return to Nonmining Capital, 1978–2005
a
Sources: NBS and authorsí calc ulations.
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lower before 1978, when there was presumably less technical progress. To
consider the implications of this possibility, we estimate the return to capi-
tal under the assumption that the depreciation rate was 4 percentage points
lower between 1952 and 1978 than after 1978, which changes our estimate
of the capital stock. As ﬁgure 6 reveals, this alternative assumption leads to
a lower return to capital in the earlier period and a similar return to capital
in the later period compared with the base case.
In the base case, capital income includes taxes, both on output (such as
the value added tax) and on enterprise income. Although society as a whole
receives the return to capital gross of taxes, business investment is driven by
the after-tax return. Figure 7 presents an estimate of the return to capital
when we exclude these taxes from capital income.
27 As the ﬁgure shows,
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Figure 6. Return to Capital under Different Assumed Depreciation Rates, 1978–2005
a
27. Data for net taxes on production are from Hsueh and Li (1999), NBS (2003), and
China Statistical Yearbook 2004 and 2006. Data on enterprise income tax are from China
Statistical Yearbook 2006.
Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.
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before-tax return.
So far we have treated the return to capital as a return to investment in
ﬁxed capital. But business also invests in inventory. Assigning all the return
to ﬁxed investment in effect treats the return to inventory investment as
zero. Yet, in many cases, the inventory stock may be an important part of an
enterprise’s total investment. Our next alternative therefore adds inventories
to the stock of ﬁxed capital in order to calculate the return on total repro-
ducible capital. As can be seen in ﬁgure 8, the inclusion of inventories
results in a more than 10-percentage-point drop in the return to capital in
the early 1980s and a 5-percentage-point drop in recent years. (We use the
GDP deﬂator as the price index for inventory and assume zero depreciation.)
The reason is that the increase in inventories was a much larger share of
gross capital formation in earlier years than it is now (22.1 percent in
1978, compared with 2.6 percent in 2005). Perhaps more important than
this effect on the estimated level of the return to capital is the observa-
tion that including inventories results in a modest rise in the return to
80 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
Figure 7. Return to Capital after Taxes, 1978–2005
a
Sources: NBS; Hsueh and Li (1999); authors’ calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.
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case estimate.
Three of the alternatives we have considered—those for residential hous-
ing, inventories, and taxes—make a substantial change to either the level or
the time path of the estimated rate of return in the base case. Figure 9 pre-
sents estimates of the return to capital between 1985 and 2005 when these
alternatives are combined and compares them with the base case. The middle
curve represents the estimate when taxes are not removed from capital
income. The resulting annual return is between 15 and 20 percent and is rising
to new highs in recent years. The lower curve represents the estimate when
taxes are excluded from capital income. Here the annual return ﬂuctuates
around 10 percent, and it, too, has recently risen to new highs.
We can compare our results with estimates by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that use data from the
industrial ﬁrm database provided by the NBS.
28 The NBS database covers
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Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8. Return to Capital Inclusive of Inventories, 1978–2005
a
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annual sales of 5 million yuan or higher. Average rates of return on physical
capital estimated for these industrial enterprises are 6.1 percent for 1998 and
12.2 percent for 2003, ﬁgures that roughly correspond to our estimates that
include inventories in the capital stock and exclude urban residential hous-
ing and taxes (8.8 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively).
However, one has to be cautious about estimates of the return to capital
measured from ﬁrm-level data, for several reasons. First, these estimates
almost always measure the capital stock at book value rather than mar-
ket value. Second, such data are rarely comprehensive, which obviously
makes it difﬁcult to make inferences about the return to capital in the
aggregate economy from such estimates. Third, because ﬁrm-level data
can contain information about existing firms only, they do not capture
the return to capital of ﬁrms that have gone out of business. With aggre-
gate data the aggregate capital stock includes the capital stock of firms
that have disappeared from the marketplace. Therefore our estimates
based on aggregate data should capture the effect of business failures on
82 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
Figure 9. Before- and After-Tax Return to Capital Excluding Urban Residential
Housing and Including Inventories, 1978–2005
a
Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.
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data do not.
Finally, it is worth comparing the return to capital in China with that in
other economies. Ideally, one would want to measure the capital share and
the capital-output ratio in all economies worldwide with the same degree
of detail with which we measure these variables in China, but this would
be prohibitively time consuming. As a shortcut, we instead compute the
capital-output ratio for the sample of economies in the Penn World Tables.
For the capital share of income, we take the residual of the labor income
share reported in 2001 by Ben Bernanke and Refet Gurkaynak; we also
assume a depreciation rate of 6 percent a year.
29 This produces some-
what different estimates for China than those from our detailed analysis
above, but the common data set provides a more direct comparison with
the other economies. Figure 10 plots the return to capital against output per
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Figure 10. Return to Capital and Output per Worker in a Sample of Economies, 1998
a
29. Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2002).
Sources: Penn World Tables; Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2002); authors’ calculations.
a. Data are for fifty-two developed and developing economies worldwide.
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the capital-output ratio at market prices. As the ﬁgure shows, the return to
capital is signiﬁcantly higher in China than in most of the other economies.
Returns to Capital across Sectors and Regions
We now examine the heterogeneity in returns to capital in China, consider-
ing ﬁrst the allocation of capital across sectors. Figure 11 plots the return to
capital in China’s primary (agriculture), secondary (construction, mining,
and manufacturing), and tertiary (services) sectors. At the beginning of
China’s reforms, the return to capital was high in the secondary sector, low
in the tertiary sector, and still lower in the primary sector. The returns to
capital in the three sectors converged through 1989, with a large increase
in the primary and tertiary sectors and a decline in the secondary sector.
However, returns to capital have again diverged since 1991, with an increased
return in the secondary sector, a slight decline in the primary sector, and a
signiﬁcant decline in the tertiary sector. These estimates use the adjusted
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006 84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
Figure 11. Return to Capital by Sector, 1978–2005
a
Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.
a. Dashed lines indicate preliminary results.
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GDP data, where the revisions largely affected services output. One possible
interpretation of the data is that, in the 1990s, many investments made in
the tertiary sector (schools and infrastructure, for example) increased returns
in the secondary sector rather than in the tertiary sector itself. It is also
likely that much of the investment in the tertiary sector contributed to pro-
ductivity and output with a substantial lag.
Figure 12 plots the return to capital, again computed from equation 4,
for each of China’s provinces in each year from 1978 to 2005. Provinces
are assigned to one of three regions, eastern, central, and western, each
represented in the ﬁgure by a common symbol. Two observations can be
made immediately from the ﬁgure. First, the return to capital is generally
highest in the eastern region, followed by the central region, and lowest
in the western region. Second, the dispersion of returns to capital across
provinces has decreased over time. Whereas in the early years of reform
(1978–82), one province, Shanghai, stood out with a much higher return
than all other provinces, the difference between Shanghai and the other
provinces has been much less prominent in later years. Figure 13 shows
Figure 12. Return to Capital by Province, 1978–2005
a















a. Data for 2004 and 2005 are preliminary; each observation represents the estimated return in one of twenty-eight provinces.
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follows a generally declining trend.
Table 2 presents transition matrices in the return to capital across
provinces in four subperiods. China’s twenty-eight provinces are grouped
into quartiles based on the return to capital in the province; we then com-
pute for each province the probability that, during a given period, it moves
from its initial quartile to one of the other three. The results show little
change in the rankings between the 1978–84 subperiod and the 1985–91
subperiod. However, the mobility among the different groups markedly
increases thereafter. For example, roughly 60 percent of provinces moved
to a different quartile between the 1985–91 and the 1992–98 subperiod.
Finally, it is worth noting that this mobility is observed mostly among the
provinces in the top three quartiles. The vast majority of provinces in the
lowest quartile remain there across all subperiods.
30
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Figure 13. Standard Deviation of Returns to Capital across Provinces, 1978–2005
a
30. Others have examined the relationship between investment ﬂow and marginal
product of capital across provinces (Gong and Xie, 2004; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005).
Sources: NBS and authors’ calculations.
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Our estimates from China’s national accounts data suggest that the return
to capital in China has remained high despite China’s remarkably high
investment rates. Our base case estimate is that the aggregate real rate of
return to capital in China is currently about 20 percent a year, somewhat
lower than the estimates for the early 1990s, for example, but not low by
comparison with other economies. Our alternative estimates, which adjust
the base case for inventories, residential capital, and taxes, average some-
what lower returns but show those returns rising to new highs in recent years.
Why have China’s high investment rates not brought low returns to
capital? We see two possible reasons. First, output growth, driven by growth
in total factor productivity and in the labor force, appears to have been quite
Chong-En Bai, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Yingyi Qian 87




From 1978–84 to 1985–91
1 (highest) 0.71 0.14 0.14 0.00
2 0.29 0.71 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.14 0.57 0.29
4 (lowest) 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.71
From 1985–91 to 1992–98
1 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.00
2 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14
3 0.14 0.43 0.14 0.29
4 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.57
From 1992–98 to 1999–2005
1 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14
2 0.57 0.14 0.14 0.14
3 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14
4 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.57
From 1978–84 to 1999–2005
1 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.14
2 0.57 0.14 0.14 0.14
3 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14
4 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.57
Source: Authors’ calculations using NBS data.
a. Table reports the probability that a province moves from the indicated group in the initial period to the indicated group in the
ﬁnal period. Group 1 consists of those Chinese provinces ranked 1 through 7 by return to capital in the indicated period; group 2,
those ranked 8 through 14; group 3, those ranked 15 through 21; and group 4, those ranked 22 through 28.
10269-02a_Bai Hsieh-rev.qxd  1/29/07  10:57 AM  Page 87rapid. Therefore the capital-output ratio does not appear to have risen by
much, despite the high investment rate. Second, the capital share of aggre-
gate income has increased steadily in China since 1998, precisely the period
that witnessed a signiﬁcant increase in the investment rate. One explanation
for this might be that a gradual restructuring of China’s industrial sector
has moved it toward more capital-intensive industries, requiring higher
aggregate investment rates in the steady state. Our data do not allow us to
examine the sources of the increase in the aggregate capital share since
1998, but this is clearly a fruitful avenue for future research.
One question we leave open concerns the allocation of investment in
China. We have provided some evidence on the efﬁciency of investment
allocation across provinces and across major sectors. We ﬁnd clear evidence
of misallocation but also some evidence that it may have lessened over time.
However, it could be that the bulk of the capital misallocation takes place
within provinces and within the three broad sectors. Data at the ﬁrm and
farm levels would be needed to address this question. However, we note
that estimates by Hsieh and Peter Klenow, using ﬁrm-level manufacturing
data, indicate improvement in the allocation of capital across ﬁrms within
sectors since 1995.
31
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Discussion
Olivier Blanchard: This is a very useful paper. There is a widely held
belief that the return to capital in China is low, driven down by an invest-
ment rate in excess of 40 percent of GDP. The paper looks at the data care-
fully and concludes that this is not the case: the rate of return decreased in
the 1990s but is now stable, yet still high, at roughly 20 percent.
The approach of the paper is straightforward. Simplifying a bit: it
deﬁnes the rate of return to capital as the ratio of proﬁt to the value of the
capital stock, minus the depreciation rate:
It then rewrites this expression as
where   is the share of capital in output.
Turning to the data, the authors ﬁnd that the ratio of the value of capital
to the value of output is relatively low in China, and the share of capital in
output is relatively high. Together these two ﬁndings imply a high rate of
return on capital. In 2005, for example, the capital-output ratio was 1.72,
the share of capital was 58 percent, and the depreciation rate was 10 per-
cent, implying a rate of return of 24 percent. This ignores the impact of the 
relative growth rates of capital and output prices, which I have left out of
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do as careful an empirical job as one can, given the somewhat unreliable
data. Still, the high value of the capital share is striking, about 15 to 20 per-
centage points above values in other countries at similar levels of develop-
ment.1 To those of us who (for no good reason) like to think of production
largely in Cobb-Douglas terms, such a dramatic difference in capital
shares is puzzling. Thus, for the presentation of the paper at the Brookings
conference, I tried my best to come up with various stories for measure-
ment error, from the misallocation of self-employment income to the dif-
ferent incentives for township and village enterprises, state-owned ﬁrms,
or multinationals to misstate proﬁts. In this ﬁnal draft the authors have
done a great job of maiming if not killing most of my tentative hypotheses.
However, I still want to take up two issues.
The ﬁrst is that of self-employment. In most low- and middle-income
countries, the reported capital share is indeed very high, often above 0.6.
But, as is well understood, a large part of what is classiﬁed as capital rev-
enue is in fact self-employment income, much of which should be counted
as labor income. When Douglas Gollin makes this adjustment, the result-
ing capital share drops, often by more than 20 percentage points.2 I
suspected that the same was likely to be true in China. It turns out, how-
ever, that until 2005 the Chinese statistical authorities classiﬁed all self-
employment income as labor income. In other words, if anything, the
reported capital share understated true capital income, at least until 2005. I
must admit that I am stumped; all I can do is be a bad loser and suggest that
someone look over the shoulders of the Chinese statistical authorities to
see how the statistics are put together.
The second issue is the implication of the reported capital share for
another standard exercise, namely, the computation of total factor produc-
tivity growth. My table 1 summarizes the conclusions from a number of
studies, which differ on a number of empirical dimensions but typically
use capital shares for the construction of the Solow residual roughly simi-
lar to those used in this paper. The general pattern is that of a decrease in
measured TFP growth over time, with very slow growth in recent years.
That true TFP growth would have slowed in China in recent years is, on
the face of it, implausible. State ﬁrms are being restructured. Foreign direct
90 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2006
1. I am using here the values for the capital share constructed by Gollin (2002).
2. Gollin (2002).
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foreign ﬁrms in China, or joint ventures including foreign ﬁrms, have
higher productivity than domestic firms. So, again, measurement error
seems to be a plausible explanation. And a natural possibility in this con-
text is again an overstatement of the capital share. To see why, suppose
that true TFP growth is given by
and measured TFP growth by
where gY, gK, and gL are the growth rates of output, capital, and labor, and
αK and ˜ αK are the true and the measured capital shares, respectively. Then,
Thus, because (gK – gL) is typically positive, if the capital share is over-
stated, measured TFP growth will understate true TFP growth. And the
downward bias will be stronger the larger is (gK – gL), and thus the higher
the investment rate. For (gK – gL) = 10 percent, for example, an overstate-
ment of the capital share by 20 percentage points will lead to an underesti-
mation of TFP growth by 2 percentage points—a substantial magnitude.
One can therefore interpret declining measured TFP growth as an indica-
tion that the capital share is overstated. Of course, this is not a proof, only
suggestive evidence.
    SS g g KK K L =+ − − () ( ) . αα
     Sg g g YK K K L =− −− αα () , 1
Sg g g YK K K L = –– ( – ) , αα 1
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Table 1. Estimates of Total Factor Productivity Growth in China by 
Various Authors
Author and date of  Estimated growth
estimate Period (percent a year)
Maddison (1998) 1952–78 –0.8
1978–95 2.2




OECD (2005) 1978–96 4.0
1997–2002 3.2
2003 2.8
Kuijs and Wang (2005) 1978–93 3.7
1993–2004 2.7
Source: Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006), updated by the author.
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ﬁrms. The paper offers a decomposition by province and by sector—
primary, secondary, and tertiary. (One may question the estimates of the
rate of return in the primary sector, given the difﬁculty of distinguishing
revenue accruing to land from revenue accruing to reproducible capital.)
Although this is an interesting analysis, two of the central questions in
China have to do with other decompositions. The ﬁrst is the rate of return
to spending on health: the provision of health care, especially in the rural
areas, has sharply declined, and it is widely believed that the social rate of
return there is very high, justifying a reallocation of investment toward that
sector.
3 Clearly, such an analysis falls outside the scope of this paper. The
second is differences in rates of return by type of ownership. Many
observers suspect that the rate of return in state ﬁrms is considerably lower
than that in new, privately owned ﬁrms.
As the authors indicate, there is no way to construct rates of return for each
ownership type separately with the data they use. But some information is
available from estimates using individual-ﬁrm data from the industrial sec-
tor (table 2). These rates of return reﬂect the inclusion of inventories in
capital, and they are measured after taxes. Thus they are lower than—but
consistent with—the base case estimates of the paper. What the table shows,
however, is a clear difference across ownership types. Private ﬁrms have
much higher rates of return than state ﬁrms. The average rate of return for
state ﬁrms is still high (and appears to have increased since 1999), but this
average hides substantial heterogeneity: the median annual rate of return is
only about1.5 percent, and 35 percent of state ﬁrms report negative proﬁts.
This has obvious implications for China’s growth strategy.
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Table 2. Rates of Return in Chinese Firms by Type of Ownershipa
Percent a year
Ownership type 1999 2003
Private 8.8 15.0
Individually controlled 12.2 16.3
Non-mainland controlled 6.9 14.2
State controlled 5.4 10.2
Directly controlled 4.8 8.2
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005).
a. Proﬁt plus interest as percent of physical capital stock and inventories, net of depreciation and taxation.
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have made a bold and worthy effort to calculate the rate of return to capital
in China since the major economic reforms began in that country in 1978.
Their principal ﬁndings are intuitively plausible, although for the reasons
offered below they are not entirely convincing. The authors ﬁnd that
annual returns to capital generally rose to above 25 percent from the mid-
1980s, after the reforms were seriously launched in the nonagricultural
sector, to the early 1990s and then gradually declined to just below 20 per-
cent in the period 1998–2005. The authors’ most important interpretation
of these results is that the admittedly high rate of investment in China—
over 40 percent of GDP in recent years—does not seem to have been too
high from an economic perspective, given that rates of return have re-
mained high.
The authors also ﬁnd, on the basis of estimates of returns to capital by
province, that the geographical dispersion of returns has declined since
1978 (with a brief uptick in 1990–1993), but at a slower rate since 1998,
although dispersion presumably remains higher than would be the case
with a fully integrated national capital market. In contrast, however, they
ﬁnd that rates of return have been diverging since the mid-1990s among
the three identiﬁed sectors of the economy: primary (mainly agriculture),
secondary (mainly manufacturing and construction), and services. One
puzzle in their results is that, in recent years, returns have been among the
highest in Heilongjiang and high as well in Liaoning, provinces in the
northeastern “rust belt” of China that contain many old, state-owned heavy
industrial ﬁrms, which are supposedly the country’s biggest money losers
(not reported in the authors’ ﬁnal draft).
The data in this paper are taken from ofﬁcial Chinese sources, supple-
mented where necessary by assumptions by the authors. The Chinese tra-
dition of business accounting and the reliance on local ofﬁcials for
statistical reporting leave little conﬁdence in Chinese economic statistics.
Ofﬁcials in the National Bureau of Statistics are well trained and doing
their best, but with raw material of uncertain value. Angus Maddison, for
instance, recalculated China’s GDP over the period 1978–95 and arrived at
an annual growth rate that was 2.4 percentage points below the ofﬁcial
growth rate of 9.9 percent.
1 The main reasons for the difference are, ﬁrst,
that Maddison believes ofﬁcial GDP was underestimated for the early
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than the reality; and second, that the ofﬁcial price index for deﬂating nom-
inal GDP is too low, leading to a higher recorded real growth rate. Mad-
dison did not report earnings on capital, so that the implications of his
downward revision of GDP growth for the rate of return to investment are
not entirely clear, but use of his revised ﬁgures would probably lower
them.
The authors invoke some economic theory, but in the end they rely
mainly on accounting: they subtract earnings of labor from GDP to get
returns to capital, and they use a perpetual inventory calculation on invest-
ment to estimate the capital stock, along with several strong assumptions
of identity and proportionality to arrive at disaggregated versions of these
measures. The accounting corresponds to the theory only under the strong
assumptions of equilibrium, competition, and constant returns to scale. All
three of these assumptions are doubtful for an economy that has changed
radically its system for allocating resources, that started with a low and
antiquated capital stock, that controlled entry and exit from many activities
(particularly all large investments), and that has invested more than 35 per-
cent of GDP in almost every year since reforms began. The authors offer a
minimum of interpretive comment on their results and no discussion of the
institutional setting in which such high investment rates occurred. The
economy is not likely to have been in competitive equilibrium during most
of this period, if indeed at any time, and, at least early in the period, new
investment in modern techniques is likely to have enjoyed increasing
returns to scale.
Their perpetual inventory method for calculating the capital stock draws
on data from the period 1952–78. This, however, was a very different econ-
omy, starting with a very low capital stock and importing much equipment
from the Soviet Union during the 1950s. Subsequent investment relied on
the same technology to produce uniform products—from imitations of and
spare parts for Soviet equipment to Mao suits for men and women—with
little change either in production technique or in the nature of the goods
produced. Thus machinery and plant could be used, with good mainte-
nance, for several decades. Outside observers (including myself) in the
early 1980s marveled at how well maintained was Chinese equipment dat-
ing from the 1950s and even, in some instances, from the 1930s. After
1979, however, China relied increasingly on sales to the world market,
especially of manufactures, and to foreign visitors to China, with their
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accommodations. Thus the same depreciation rates for capital goods
should not be used for both periods: economic depreciation was much
more rapid in the second period (see the authors’ ﬁgure 6).
The focus of the authors is on the total ﬁxed capital stock (that is,
excluding inventories), broken down as necessary by province or by sec-
tor. I believe, however, that a sharp distinction should be made between
the housing stock and capital used for more directly productive purposes—
to produce other goods and services, not as a place to live. The distinction
matters greatly in the case of China, where, as in France and Germany in
the 1960s and 1970s, incomes have been rising rapidly and many people
are moving out of agriculture into the cities. In real terms, China’s income
per capita grew by a factor of more than four between 1980 and 2004.
2
With such a sharp increase in income, people naturally want more and
better residential space, and the Chinese economy has responded to this
increased demand. Roughly one quarter of investment in recent years—
nearly 10 percent of GDP—has been in residential construction, an
increasing share of it privately owned. 
How are rents on owner-occupied housing incorporated into China’s
GDP? The authors report that annual rents are imputed as 3 percent of the
value of the residential capital stock, well below the 20 to 25 percent rate
of return they report for total ﬁxed capital stock. Thus, removing residen-
tial housing from the capital stock, and removing this imputed return from
nonlabor income, raises the estimated return on the remaining capital by
about 5 percentage points in recent years. (Allowing for inventories and
work in progress, in contrast, reduces the calculated return by about 5 per-
centage points, as shown in the authors’ ﬁgure 8.) 
Cutting in the opposite direction, however, is the fact that returns to
capital are calculated as the residual of national income less labor compen-
sation. This residual includes, among other things, land rents, not just
returns to capital. The authors deduct an estimate of agricultural and min-
eral rents from their base case estimate, but this adjustment has little
impact after 1990. However, there was no market for land or structures in
China before the mid-1990s, and since then there is only a very imperfect
market for leaseholds. Land use is not in market equilibrium: private and
social values could be increased signiﬁcantly by converting agricultural
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a grand scale around virtually all of China’s urban areas in the past decade,
converting peasant agricultural land to business and residential space, as
well as making room for highways and other infrastructure such as power
plants. Such conversions are now the major source of social disturbance, as
peasants rebel against having “their” land—which is technically owned by
the village or county—taken away, sometimes with inadequate or even no
compensation. These changes in land use bring large rewards to develop-
ers, to city governments, and often to city ofﬁcials in the form of bribes, as
well as to the businesses that get to use the land. 
Given the authors’ method of computing the return to capital, these high
rewards to more efﬁcient use of land will be imputed to capital; however,
it is not clear that this is appropriate. It is true that they add to GDP (prop-
erly measured), and that they would not occur without new structures hav-
ing been built on the land and without access roads, water and sewerage,
and power. But an increase in land value caused by investment in infra-
structure is not what one usually means by “marginal return to capital.”
Even if construction occurred under competitive conditions, there would
still be a substantial increase in rental value that is somehow shared among
the decisionmaking parties but imputed to capital under the method used
here. Although the magnitude of these rewards to changes in land use is
not fully known (to me at least), they are undoubtedly high. For instance,
about one-third of local revenues are “off budget,” mainly from sale of
leases to land, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Their
inclusion in the authors’ calculations thus overstates the “returns to cap-
ital” as that term is normally interpreted. In particular, the very high
returns—typically around 30 percent over the last decade—calculated for
the “secondary” sector, which includes construction, may in part result
from this attribution of increased rents from discrete changes in land use,
starting from disequilibrium, to returns to capital. The value of urban land
is such that the main economic value of many money-losing state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) is the land they occupy, but that should not be counted
as a return to their capital.
The authors say they want to measure the marginal return to capital. But
in fact they measure its average return, after deducting labor compensa-
tion. That their estimate has not changed much over 1998–2004 suggests
that the marginal rate of return does not differ substantially from the aver-
age, but their sectoral and provincial calculations belie this, suggesting that
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from the aggregation of very different returns that also change in offsetting
directions. 
The authors’ base case estimates, however, get some support from 
the reported returns on U.S. direct investment in China, which averaged
19.7 percent over 2001–05, very close to the authors’ estimates over the
same period. It should be added that these data, too, are subject to prob-
lems of measurement and interpretation.
China is known to have an extremely inefﬁcient capital market. House-
holds save a lot but have only limited opportunities for ﬁnancial invest-
ment, mainly in bank deposits. The corporate capital market is virtually
nonexistent. Enterprises get loans from banks or, at much higher interest
rates, from the informal curb market, often friends and relatives. Banks
lend overwhelmingly to SOEs, many of which lose money, although some,
particularly those with protected market positions, make large proﬁts.
SOEs pay taxes on their proﬁts, but they pay no dividends; so the prof-
itable SOEs either reinvest in their business, or buy out other ﬁrms, or
deposit their funds in banks (business deposits account for a large portion
of the high saving rate in China), perhaps to borrow their deposits again
because of the private incentives to managers of both banks and ﬁrms.
Thus, at present, domestic market pressures to equalize rates of return
across regions and activities in China are limited. Some pressure is pro-
vided by foreign investors, who have many different locations to choose
from and a choice of many activities to invest in (although not all are open
to them, especially in the services sector).
If the paper’s main ﬁnding—a continuing relatively high rate of return
on capital formation in China—withstands closer scrutiny, it implies that,
contrary to a widespread view, China may not be investing too much after
all. Nonresidential investment in China is comparable to that in Japan and
South Korea during their rapid-growth periods. New members of the non-
agricultural labor force are arriving in great numbers and must be sup-
ported with places to work, modern equipment, and working capital.
Moreover, as already discussed, “investment” in the national accounts
includes investment in housing, and China contains millions of people on
the move and other millions who desire and are able to upgrade signiﬁ-
cantly the quality of their housing. Neither of these processes is likely to
stop anytime soon. China has moved over 20 percent of its labor force out
of agriculture since the beginning of reform in 1978, yet agriculture still
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capital-labor ratio in the productive sectors and ample unskilled labor; thus
the investment boom may continue for some years without pushing down
rates of return.
General discussion: William Nordhaus, following up on Olivier Blan-
chard’s comment, noted the large difference, at least in the United States,
between the average annual before-tax rate of return on capital for the
whole economy and the after-tax return for the nonﬁnancial business sec-
tor. The ﬁrst is typically between 15 and 20 percent, the second only
around 6 percent. He suggested that the paper’s most relevant estimates of
returns were those that adjusted for inventories, housing, and taxes, and
those for the secondary (predominantly manufacturing) sector. The base
case returns, which are based on aggregate nonlabor income and a capital
stock that includes residential structures but not inventories, seemed the
least useful. 
Wing Woo commented on how the authors’ ﬁnding of persistent high
rates of return informed some important issues confronting the Chinese
economy. He suggested two explanations for why China is a net capital
exporter despite high domestic returns to capital. The ﬁrst is the high risk
premium that international markets assign to Chinese investments because
of ofﬁcial discrimination against private investment, weak protection of
property rights, historical weakness in the rule of law, vulnerability of
China’s access to foreign markets, and rampant corruption. Two recent
episodes illustrated the importance of these factors: foreign direct invest-
ment ﬂows into China had surged after 1992, when Deng Xiaoping
embarked on a much-publicized tour to move China toward a private mar-
ket economy (seen as implying a reduction in discrimination against the
private sector), and again after 2000 when it became clear that China
would accede to the World Trade Organization and obtain guaranteed
access to the U.S. market (seen as implying a reduction in market access
risk). The second explanation is that China has an extraordinarily high sav-
ing rate, which, in turn, arises from two features of its economic system.
First, with the advent of capitalism, social safety nets weakened, and the
resulting increased insecurity led to greater saving. Second, the failures of
China’s banking system sharply limited the ability to borrow for invest-
ment, forcing individuals and most businesses to invest from their own
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increase once agricultural land is privatized.
John Cochrane viewed China’s situation in terms of a standard growth
model in which the economy is not in a steady state. In a conventional pro-
duction function using labor and physical capital, China’s low capital-to-
labor ratio might well lead one to expect investment to exceed 40 percent
of GDP. If, on the other hand, the model’s production function uses human
capital rather than labor, one might expect a much lower investment rate.
Cochrane also noted that a 20 percent real rate of return is very high, espe-
cially when compared with the U.S. real rate of interest, and he agreed
with Woo that the difference should be understood as stemming largely
from differences in risk.
Gary Jefferson compared the paper’s estimates of the rate of return in
manufacturing with results he and his colleagues at China’s National
Bureau of Statistics had obtained using ﬁrm-level data. Their estimates,
which differed somewhat in levels from those in the paper because of dif-
ferent estimating assumptions, showed a noticeable recovery after 1998,
which they attributed to the gradual conversion of state-owned enterprises
to private ownership. The fraction of state-owned enterprises in the indus-
trial sector declined substantially between 1995 and 2005.
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